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Abstract: Considerable differences exist between Germany and Anglo-
American countries in the development of the statutory audit, the
emergence of professional associations of auditors, and the legal and
organizational forms of audit firms. This paper examines historical
developments in Germany from the late 19th century, to the formal
regulation of auditing and the audit profession in 1931. Its main
objective is to provide a better understanding of the comparatively
slow development of the audit in Germany and reveal attitudes to-
wards the audit and the forms of audit firms. A secondary objective is
to examine the use of agency theory frameworks for this type of
historical research. The study draws on primary and secondary
sources, both of which have been underutilized by previous authors.
The paper finds that many of the unique features of the development
of auditing in Germany and the solutions adopted there can be traced
to historical differences concerning the objectives of the audit, the
structure of the audit market and the foundations of the audit profes-
sion. It further adds to the critique of agency theory assumptions in
historical contexts.
INTRODUCTION
The histories of the statutory audit and the auditing profes-
sion in Germany contrast significantly with their development
in Anglo-American contexts. In the UK, for example, the statu-
tory corporate audit was first introduced in 1844, abandoned
(for most sectors) in 1856 and reintroduced by the Companies
Act, 1900. During the 19th century the accounting profession
emerged as a number of separate associations – the earliest
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being the organizations formed in Edinburgh and Glasgow in
1853. In Germany, however, both the statutory audit and profes-
sional associations were to appear much later. While market
demand for the audit developed slowly during the late 19th to
early 20th centuries, and audit firms and professional associa-
tions emerged to meet this demand, the annual audit of finan-
cial statements remained voluntary in Germany until 1931. This
was despite active lobbying for state regulation by the heteroge-
neous profession. A further contrast between the British and
German audit markets is the different legal and organizational
forms that have been preferred for audit firms. German audit
firms, especially larger ones, have traditionally favored a corpo-
rate form of organization. Independent practices of sole proprie-
tors or loose forms of partnerships (which mainly served the
sharing of resources and were not legal entities) were alternative
forms. Partnerships in the British sense are a very recent devel-
opment in Germany. In the UK on the other hand sole propri-
etorship and partnership were the only legal forms available to
audit firms until 1991.
The objective of the present paper is to shed light on the
comparatively slow development of the statutory audit in Ger-
many, examine the different attitudes to the legal and organiza-
tional forms of audit firms, and to analyze the development of
German auditing and audit firms prior to their statutory regula-
tion in 1931. Specifically, the paper aims to examine the validity
of suggestions that the German audit profession was created by
the state, unlike that in the UK, which is claimed to have been
created by market forces. In examining the origin of the German
audit profession, the paper traces the history of two very differ-
ent groups, whose disputes over market share and audit regula-
tion may have contributed to the need for government interfer-
ence. Further, the paper focuses on the background to the
preference for the corporate form of audit firms in Germany
and examines contemporary arguments for and against this
form. This issue was significant because it divided the two
branches of the profession in Germany. The paper does not at-
tempt to take an overtly comparative approach between Ger-
many and the UK. While professionalization issues have been
explored for the latter [see for example, Willmott, 1986; Walker,
1995; Matthews et al., 1998], much less is written on the German
case [but see Meisel, 1992; Markus, 1997; Gietzmann and Quick,
1998]. The present contribution seeks to extend understandings
of the peculiar development of the institutions of auditing in
Germany.
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While the author is aware of alternative approaches to his-
torical scholarship the paper is loosely based on an agency
theory framework. This approach is adopted for a number of
interrelated reasons. Firstly, agency theory claims to explain the
development of the independent external audit in the UK and
US. Secondly, Watts and Zimmerman [1983] use historical data,
namely an examination of the development of the independent
audit, as evidence to support their theory. Further, an agency
theory approach has been used in historical research by, for
example, Gray and Calvasina [1995, p. 35] in the expectation
that it would “enhance our understanding of agency rela-
tionships and foster[s] greater recognition of the limitations
and hazards of historical research using an agency literature
framework” [see also Mills, 1993]. Thus a subsidiary objective of
this paper is to consider the limitations of Watts and
Zimmerman’s assumptions, specifically in a historical, non-
Anglo-American setting and to extend the critique of agency
theory.
Further, and of particular relevance to the focus of this pa-
per, there exists a considerable body of literature on agency
theory which confidently declares that the partnership form of
business organization is most suited to professional audit firms.
However, a rudimentary knowledge of the profession outside
the US and UK suggests that the corporate form has been popu-
lar among audit firms in other countries [see, for example, the
avant project – the unpublished working draft – to the Eighth
European Union Company Law Directive, Working Party on Au-
diting, 1972]. These contrasts raise questions about the agency
theory framework and invite critical scrutiny.
A combination of primary and secondary sources on the
history of German auditing and the audit profession were used
for this study. Secondary sources comprised literature in En-
glish and German. Primary sources used were German legisla-
tion, and commentaries and contemporary views expressed in
academic or professional literature. Business journals were es-
tablished early in Germany. Their content reflects the emphasis
on academic education in business subjects, the early creation
of business schools, and the fact that it was common for practi-
tioners as well as academics to publish in these journals. As well
as journal articles, contemporary academic theses and textbooks
provided material for the current study. Many of the latter
reveal somewhat amateurish scholarship and are often
unashamedly biased. A further rich source was provided by
publications in years immediately following the period under
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investigation, where authors contrasted recent changes with
historical experiences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
next section introduces the agency theory framework. Then fol-
lows an overview of the history of the German profession from
its beginnings until 1931, when the annual external audit be-
came a legal requirement for large corporations and the profes-
sion was regulated by statute. This section focuses in particular
on the conflicts between the two branches of the audit profes-
sion during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These con-
flicts related to regulation, organization and market share. The
penultimate section discusses the main findings with reference
to the agency theory framework. The final section presents a
brief summary and conclusions.
THE AGENCY THEORY FRAMEWORK
Agency problems and costs arise from the separation of
ownership and control in modern companies. This separation
gives rise to agency relationships between the owners and those
who manage the company on their behalf. Jensen and Meckling
[1976, p. 308] define an agency relationship “as a contract under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf
which involves delegating some decision making authority to
the agent”. Problems arising from this relationship relate to the
fact that the agent, as utility maximizer, may not act in the
interest of the principal.1 Agency and related theories claim that
agency problems between shareholders and management led to
the development of the independent external audit (as a moni-
toring and bonding mechanism) and that the legal form of part-
nership avoids or minimizes agency problems within the audit
firm. Financial reporting is the means by which management
(the agents) discharge their accountability to the shareholders
(the principals). Watts and Zimmerman [1986] claim that: “[t]he
demand for accounting arises from its use in contracts that
1 The principal can attempt to limit this effect by creating incentives for the
agent to act in the principal’s interest, and by monitoring the agent’s behaviour,
or arranging for this to be done on his behalf (giving rise to monitoring costs).
The agent may also expend resources to reassure the principal that he will not
act against his interest (bonding costs). In spite of these safeguards, however,
the agent’s decisions cannot be guaranteed to maximise the principal’s welfare,
which gives rise to an additional cost to the principal (residual loss) [Jensen and
Meckling, 1976].
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reduce the firm’s agency costs. However, those contracts are of
little use in reducing agency costs unless their provisions are
monitored and enforced. Auditing is one of the ways in which
the contracts are monitored” [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.
312].
The assumption that auditing is one of the ways of reducing
agency costs led Watts and Zimmerman to examine the sugges-
tion that “independent audits are expected in the earliest firms
where the manager did not supply all the capital” [1983, p. 613].
They found that monitoring and auditing existed early in the
history of business organizations, and eventually developed into
the audit as required in British legislation during the 19th cen-
tury. They also stated that early audits were carried out by insid-
ers (directors/shareholders). The independent audit, carried out
by professionals, did not develop until the mid 19th century in
the UK and the early 20th century in the US, and predated the
legal requirement. Watts and Zimmerman [1983, p. 614] con-
cluded that “the use of professional auditors was due to changes
in the market for auditing”. These changes resulted from in-
creased numbers of companies, increased company size, and the
reduced cost of ensuring auditor competence and independence.
The latter was the result of the formation of professional asso-
ciations from the middle of the 19th century [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1983]. Watts and Zimmerman dismiss the alterna-
tive suggestion that independent audits in the UK and US were
created by government regulation. Contracting theory claims to
explain not only the existence of audits but also the significance
attributed to audit firm reputation and the existence of profes-
sional associations, the organizational form chosen and the au-
dit firms’ size and industry specialization. These three claims
are explored below.
Reputation and Professional Associations: According to Watts
and Zimmerman [1986, Chapter 13], audits only have value if
they lead to a reduction of agency costs. This will only be the
case if the market is convinced of the auditor’s competence (to
discover a breach of contract) and independence from manage-
ment (i.e. the likelihood that he/she will report a breach of con-
tract). The market will only be convinced of the auditor’s inde-
pendence if there are sufficient incentives for the auditor to be
independent. Such incentives include reputation (and the ability
to charge higher fees) and the existence of professional societies
(since a system of accreditation can support the auditor’s repu-
tation for competence and independence, which is signaled by a
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“brand name” such as “chartered accountant”) [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986]. Further, since in professional partnerships
(including audit firms) there are usually few assets available to
serve as a bond against the risks of adverse selection or moral
hazard [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523], reputation and
membership of a professional association can serve as the
auditor’s collateral (since loss of reputation and/or loss of mem-
bership in a professional body would lead to a loss of fee in-
come) [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986]. Further, the fact that
partners are residual profit owners increases their motivation to
build a strong reputation.
Organizational Form: An advantage of the partnership is that
unlimited liability provides, in the form of the partners’ personal
assets, a larger bond than would be available in an incorporated
audit firm with limited liability [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986,
p. 317; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523]. This is especially
because audit firms tend to have few assets which could serve as
a bond. Thus: “. . . if auditors incorporate with limited liability,
they reduce the amount of assets available as a bond on their
actions. The market will appropriately reduce its assessed prob-
ability of their independence. Ceteris paribus, unlimited part-
nerships provide a greater bond on the auditors’ independence”
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 317]. However, a disadvantage
of this is that in a partnership with unlimited liability, risk is not
divisible or transferable.2 This will lead investors to spend addi-
tional resources on monitoring, or not invest at all [Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992, p. 522]. Further: “[t]his factor constrains
partnerships from expanding the number of partners and reduc-
ing the amount invested by each to permit better diversification.
Similarly it makes it expensive for partnerships to expand into
different lines of business or into new geographical markets be-
cause such moves increase the cost of monitoring” [ibid.]. How-
ever, the need for outside capital is generally limited due to low
capital requirements – the most important asset of a partnership
is human capital. Further, in the partnership form individual
partners are jointly and severally liable. Liability for the other
partners’ work provides a strong incentive for mutual monitor-
ing [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523]. Mutual monitoring by
partners who are liable for each other’s actions, provides further
2 It may be transferable through insurance. However, it has been argued by
the UK profession that it is difficult to obtain sufficient cover at a reasonable
cost.
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incentives for increasing competence and independence and re-
duces the risk of an individual auditor bending to management
influence [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986].3
Greenwood, Hinings and Brown [1990] argue, with respect
to large professional partnerships, that these contrast with other
large organizations in that ownership and governance structures
are different, and because work is carried out almost exclusively
by “self-contained” professionals. Greenwood et al use the ac-
countancy industry as an example and find that: “In summary
the task of accounting firms is professional in that it requires
the application of professional knowledge to complex situations,
and the work itself is individualized, geographically dispersed,
and geographically differentiated” [Greenwood et al, 1990, p.
733]. As a result, authority and decision making structures in
partnerships differ from those in corporations.
Size: Fama and Jensen [1983a] consider size to be an important
factor in the context of the separation of ownership and control
(or risk-bearing and decision making). In professional partner-
ships most decisions are made locally: “At this level, however,
decision management and decision control are not separate. To
control the resulting agency problems, the residual claims in
professional partnerships, large and small, are restricted to the
professional agents who have the major decision-making roles”
[Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p. 316]. In small partnerships, as with
sole traders and close corporations, decision-makers are usually
the residual risk bearers. However, in large professional partner-
ships, residual claims are diffused; residual risk-bearing and de-
cision management may be separate. This requires the existence
of strong mutual monitoring systems common in other complex
organizations. Yet, because all the residual claimants are experts
in the professional partnership’s activities, there is little demand
for monitoring by outside experts [Fama and Jensen, 1983a].
Further, monitoring by outsiders (non-experts) is difficult
[Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523]. Finally, decision control
systems are similar between all such types of organization –
open corporations, large professional partnerships, financial
mutuals and nonprofits etc. [Fama and Jensen, 1983a, but see
3 For example, Watts and Zimmerman [1986, pp. 316-317] argue: “It is inter-
esting that before the development of the professional audit firm the audit was
conducted by a committee of shareholders. The committee form makes it more
difficult for the manager to bribe the auditor, particularly with mutual monitor-
ing by the committee members”.
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Greenwood et al., 1990, above]. Firm size may also be related to
independence and competence, since larger firms provide
economies of scale for the development of brand-names, offer
larger bonds and better opportunities for mutual monitoring
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986].
The validity of many of these explanations for the develop-
ment of the external corporate audit and the organization of
audit firms could, and to some extent have been, subject to
criticism in the UK context. While it is not within the scope of
this paper to provide a critique of agency theory in Anglo-Ameri-
can settings, it should be noted that critics of positive theory, of
which agency theory forms a part, challenge its philosophical
foundations [Tinker, Merino and Neimark, 1982; Chua, 1986]
and the neo-classical assumptions which underpin agency
theory [Chua, 1986; Hunt and Hogler, 1990]. The theory’s meth-
odology is also challenged, in particular, the fact that few at-
tempts have been made to test the theory through conventional
scientific approaches of falsification [Christenson, 1983]. Fur-
ther, Hunt and Hogler [1990] question Jensen and Meckling’s
[1976, p. 310] assumption that the firm is a “legal fiction which
merely serves as a nexus for contracting relationships” and con-
sider it a weakness that agency theory appears unable “to ad-
dress issues that do not revolve around identifiable, market-
based contracting relationships, or to analyze imbalances of
power inherent in the social context of an organization” [Hunt
and Hogler, 1990, p. 443; see also Chua, 1986]. They also criti-
cize the theory for its ideological foundation and the assumption
that accountants behave as objective, unbiased experts, with no
concern for policy and social consequences [see also Tinker, et
al., 1982; Chua, 1986; Broadbent, Dietrich, and Laughlin, 1996].
Observations on the suitability of agency theory in an account-
ing history context will be made later in the paper.
In summary, this section has aimed to provide a brief over-
view of explanations offered by agency and contracting theories
for the existence of the independent external audit, and of cer-
tain features of audit firms and regulation. The following sec-
tion explores the development of the audit and audit firms in
Germany as a basis for the subsequent discussion of the applica-
bility of the agency theory framework.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING AND
AUDIT FIRMS IN GERMANY
Early “Audits”: The modern audit in Germany emanated from
the internal audit, and the employment by the courts of legal
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experts and professional trustees [Meisel, 1992, p. 39]. The need
for internal audit arose in the 15th century with the develop-
ment of large merchant houses (such as the Fugger and the
Welser) and of state-owned companies, and resulted from the
physical separation of owners from remote branches of their
firms [Meisel, 1992, pp. 35-38]. From the 16th century, and in-
creasingly in the 17th and 18th centuries, external “audits”4 were
carried out by gerichtlich vereidigte or beeidete Bücherrevisoren
(auditors sworn in court). These were expert witnesses in legal
disputes [Meisel, 1992, pp. 39-46], who were engaged to review
and correct financial information [Henning, 1990].
The first business corporations developed during the 17th
century in The Netherlands, France, and England. However, it
was not until the second half of the 19th century that the
Aktiengesellschaft (AG – public share company) began to domi-
nate the economy in Germany. Its growth was due to increased
demand for capital required by industrial expansion, in the
transport sector in particular [Meisel, 1992, pp. 60-61]. The early
AGs were subject to a Konzessionssystem (licensing system), that
is, they required a license and were subject to state supervision
[Meisel, 1992, p. 62]. This was the case in the first German law
regulating AGs, the Prussian Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften
(Stock Corporation law) of 1843 [Meisel, 1992, p. 61]. Specific
accounting and publication requirements for AGs were laid
down in the Aktienregulativ of 1856 [Schröer, 1993; Schneider,
1995]. However, there was no legal requirement for an external
audit (although internal, or voluntary external audits, were not
uncommon [Schröer, 1993]).
4 A brief note is required on the translation of terminology across languages
and time. The term “audit” is used here in a wider sense than understood in the
context of the modern external audit in the UK or US. However, there are no
exact equivalents in translation between languages, and the old German term for
auditor does not mean exactly the same as “auditor” or “chartered accountant”.
Each of these are technical terms that can only be fully understood within their
unique contexts. The problem is exacerbated by translation across time. Mills
(1989) warns against the possibility that we may be misled by vocabulary in
historical contexts. The old German term approximately equivalent to “audit” is
Revision (the modern German term (since 1931) is Wirtschaftsprüfung). The
texts examined here use the terms Revision and Prüfung, which are treated as
synonyms [Meisel, 1992]. Especially during the 1920s, German authors tend to
use the terms (Bücher-)Revisor/Revision in translation when they discuss the UK
auditor and audit. While German authors were more or less aware of the differ-
ences in status, organisation, techniques, etc., they appear in principle to con-
sider the German Bücherrevisor to be comparable to the British auditor [e.g.
Raschenberger, 1929; Schwäbische Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft, 1931].
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The first company law for all German states was created
with the Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB –
General German Commercial Code) of 1861. This represented
the first codification of the internal organization of the AG –
regulating the Generalversammlung (general meeting), the
Vorstand (management board) and the (optional) Aufsichtsrat
(supervisory board5) [Meisel, 1992, p. 63]. The latter, if ap-
pointed, was responsible for monitoring management and the
auditing of the accounts [Article 225]. The law was reformed in
1870 [Gesetz betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien
und die Aktiengesellschaften]. Changes included the removal of
the licensing system and its replacement by a new Norma-
tivsystem (“normative” system). This meant AGs no longer re-
quired licensing by the state and were no longer subject to state
supervision [§ 2 Article 249a; see also Quick, 1990; Meisel, 1992,
p. 63] but instead, once registered, they were subject to general
rules and regulations. The new regulation was intended to pro-
vide better protection for shareholders; the individual company
should be subject to continuous supervision and control through
its owners [Reich, 1979]. The supervisory board became obliga-
tory; it had to consist of at least three members selected from
the shareholders [§ 1 Article 209 (6)]. Article 225a required that
the supervisory board monitor the management of the AG. It
also gave its members rights of access to documents and infor-
mation, required them to audit the accounts and proposals for
profit distribution and to report to the annual general meeting
[ibid., see also Klausing, 1933, pp. 172-173; Karoli, 1934]. The
members of the supervisory board were jointly and severally
liable for certain breaches of the law such as the unlawful distri-
bution of profits [Article 225b]. The board would at times em-
ploy professional auditors to fulfill their duties [Quick, 1990].
Advancing industrialization and the financial inflow of
French reparations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871
contributed a dramatic increase in company formations and
corporate expansions and mergers [Meisel, 1992, p. 64]. Associ-
ated with these changes was the increasing separation of owner-
ship and control and growing shareholdings by banks
[Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 88]. Easier access to the vehicle
of the AG, and its de facto weaker regulatory system, appears to
5 The two-tier board structure, which remains a feature of modern German
public companies, allows different stakeholder groups to be involved in the
governance of the firm.
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have been one of the factors leading to the subsequent economic
crisis of the early 1870s (Gründerkrise) which was associated
with increased formation of AGs, bankruptcies, liquidations,
speculation and fraud [Reich, 1979; Meisel, 1992, p. 63]. The
extant law was too vague in its requirements regarding the su-
pervisory board’s monitoring duties, and supervisory board
members often failed to perform even these duties. Their boards’
understanding of financial statements was also doubted
[Gietzman and Quick, 1998]. Further, the growing involvement
of supervisory board members in the management function
threatened their independence [Karoli, 1934], thereby “calling
into question whether there did in fact exist an independent
two-tier form of corporate governance” [Gietzmann and Quick,
1998, p. 88].
The crisis during the 1870s led to calls for the introduction
of a statutory audit [Haibt, 1998]. This demand was not met
when the law was further amended in 1884, in the form of a new
Gesetz betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die
Aktiengesellschaften.6 The new law extended the rights and duties
of the supervisory board regarding monitoring, auditing and re-
porting.7 The general meeting or, under specific circumstances a
minority of 10 percent of the shareholders, could demand the
appointment of external auditors [§ 1 Article 239a]. The 1884
law did introduce one form of compulsory audit – an audit of
the company formation process by the supervisory board and
the management board. Article 209h, which dealt with this
6 The Begründung (explanatory memorandum) to the 1884 law is an interest-
ing source of data regarding company foundations and failures from 1870. Be-
fore the 1870 law, Prussia had a total of 203 AGs. A further 843 new AGs were
founded in the following three years alone. The memorandum laments the fact
that the average (initial) share capital of the AGs had fallen from almost 11
million Marks among the old AGs to a third of this, and that some AGs had
share capital of less than 100,000 Marks. Many of the new AGs were conversions
of private enterprises, rather than new company foundations [Begründung].
Frauds had apparently been expected to follow the change from the licensing
system, but not to the extent that they actually occurred [ibid.]. The abuses of
the system led to serious consideration of the abolition of the legal form of AG
[ibid., p. 242].
7 For example, Article 225 (translation) states that “the members of the
supervisory board may not delegate their duties to other persons”. Article 225a
prohibited the same individuals from being members of the supervisory board
and management board. Article 226 made the members of the supervisory board
and management board jointly and severally liable for damages arising from the
breach of certain legal provisions.
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audit, required the appointment of besondere (“special”), exter-
nal auditors where members of either board were also founders
of the company, had made contributions in kind to the com-
pany,8 or had negotiated particular advantages for themselves
[see also e.g. Beigel, 1924; Karoli, 1934, see also below]. The
benefit of this audit was subsequently questioned because the
“clients” were the company founders, who would have been in a
strong position to influence the auditors [Hintner, 1926, p. 21;
see also below].
Apart from these specific audit provisions, the external
audit remained voluntary. The law assumed the competence and
integrity of the supervisory board and the intelligence of the
general meeting, with its potential power to appoint indepen-
dent auditors [Quick, 1990]. However, this right was rarely used,
“since it was generally perceived that this might signal to the
financial community that the organization was experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties” [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 88]. The
general meeting had been intended as the highest decision-
making organ; in practice it did not fulfill this expectation
[Reich, 1979]. Further, after the 1884 law, the supervisory board
was still perceived to be an impossible hybrid, and remained
involved in the companies’ management and/or did not meet its
control function [Karoli, 1934; Reich, 1979]. Its members con-
tinued to lack the necessary expertise and time required for
effective monitoring. While the board often drew on the services
of professional auditors, this did not happen in all cases.
One interesting and far-reaching change implemented by
the 1884 law was the raising of the minimum value of a share to
1000 Mark [Article 207a]. This effectively closed the AG to small
and medium-sized enterprises and made it the typical legal form
of large enterprises. It also led to the increasing role of banks as
providers of capital [Reich, 1979]. The lack of access to the
limited liability legal form for small and medium-sized enter-
prises resulted in the creation of the Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH – private limited company) in
1892.
A new Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB – Commercial Code) in
1897 introduced few new accounting and auditing rules
[Schröer, 1993], although §§ 192-194 somewhat strengthened
the position of those charged with the audit of the foundation
8 Sacheinlagen (“contributions in kind”) rather than Bareinlagen (“cash sub-
scriptions”).
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process.9 While conceding that this audit had proved successful,
Voß [1927, p. 17] argued that the legal provisions were not suffi-
cient to ensure that the legislator’s intentions had been met, in
particular because the audit was usually carried out by the com-
panies’ management and the supervisory boards, and only under
specific conditions by “special” auditors. Voß considered this to
be a defect in the law, frequently used as a “loophole”, which
allowed companies to circumvent the requirement to appoint
external auditors. For example:
Straw men have been placed onto the management
board or supervisory board; that has in fact happened,
for example when auditors had been appointed by the
chamber of commerce, who did not suit the company
concerned, or one has – and that is the main point at
issue – set up a so-called veiled Sachgründung [com-
pany formation based on non-cash capital contribu-
tions]; that is, initially a company was founded through
Bargründung [company formation by cash subscrip-
tion], but it was planned from the start that this com-
pany should purchase certain assets - the Sachgründung
was therefore carried out as the second step, by a de-
tour [ibid., translation, see also footnote 8].
Such cases of deliberate deception apart, the perception was
that the control function of the supervisory board had not im-
proved since the 1884 law. Römer [1905, p. 262, translation]
complained: “How can somebody who holds 35 supervisory
board positions or who has never seen a book of account, let
alone kept one – and we have such supervisory board members!
– be able to discharge their incumbent statutory duties of con-
trol?”
Apart from the compulsory audit of the company founda-
tion process, approximately 60% of German AGs were, by the
1920s, undergoing either a form of internal or voluntary exter-
nal audit [Klausing, 1933, pp. 173-174].10 It appears though that
9 It described what specifically was to be audited and dealt with potential
conflicts between auditors and founders, which had to be decided by the respon-
sible chamber of commerce [see also Gareis, 1900, pp. 180-184 and Hintner,
1926, pp. 20-21]. Further, the auditor was granted the right of access to all books
and records, cash balances, stock etc. [§ 267, 1; see also Hintner, 1926].
10 Leffson [1988] estimates that by 1900 almost 60% of German AGs were
voluntarily undergoing an external audit. An internal audit would have been
carried out by members of the supervisory board or employees of the auditee,
i.e. by parties who were not independent. An external audit, on the other hand,
would have been performed by an independent individual or company carrying
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initally the external audit was of limited benefit and mainly
consisted of a comparison of the accounts with books and
records [Quick, 1990]. Many enterprises which would have ben-
efited from an independent external audit due to the limited
competence of their management were either not audited or
arranged for a “Scheinrevision”. The latter referred to an audit
opinion which was “bought” from “so-called” auditors in order
to present the appearance of orderly accounting and manage-
ment, until the company finally collapsed [Klausing, 1933, p.
174].
Auditors and the Emergence of Audit Firms : External audits were
mainly carried out by vereidigte Bücherrevisoren (sworn in audi-
tors) and notaries [Meisel, 1992, p. 76]. Originally the
Bücherrevisoren (BR)11 were sworn-in by the courts only in rela-
tion to specific appointments, but during the second half of the
19th century they were increasingly granted this status on a
permanent basis. In 1895 approximately 140 individuals were
thus licensed in Germany. A further 20 auditors were appointed
by the chambers of commerce of the cities of Hamburg, Bremen
and Lübeck [Penndorf, 1932; Meisel, 1992, p. 91]. In 1900 the
Gewerbeordnung (Trade Regulations Statute) was amended to
permit the licensing of auditors by authorities other than the
courts, most notably the state and the chambers of commerce
[Klausing, 1933, p. 174; Meisel, 1992, pp. 94-95]. However, ques-
tions regarding the quality of some of the individuals thus ap-
pointed soon arose [Quick, 1990]. For example, there appears to
have been a lack of commercially educated, independent BR
fully conversant with double entry [Klausing, 1933, p. 174].
Although audit work was only part of the BRs’ work [Römer
1905, pp. 119-120], at around the turn of the century they began
to face competition from the new Treuhandgesellschaften (THG -
trust companies). The first such company was the Deutsche
Treuhand Gesellschaft (originally: Deutsch-Amerikanische
Treuhandgesellschaft), which was founded in 1890 and based on
the example of American trust companies [Meisel, 1992, pp. 6-
7]. The Deutsche Treuhand Gesellschaft was founded by the
out similar work for other clients (but see below regarding the problem of firms
related to the auditee). As it was voluntary, the scope of the audit would have
varied, depending on the supervisory board’s requirements. The auditors would
have reported to the supervisory board, which may have referred to the auditors’
report in its report to the General Meeting.
11 In 1943 the name was changed to vereidigte Buchprüfer.
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Deutsche Bank AG, the Bankhaus Jacob S.H. Stern and others,
and was intended as a finance and trust company for the benefit
of shareholders in foreign enterprises [Hintner, 1926, pp. 14-15,
115; Meisel, 1992, p. 7]. After 1900 the Deutsche Treuhand
Gesellschaft was often involved in company reconstructions,
which usually required the help of auditors12 and it soon devel-
oped its own audit department. When economic conditions im-
proved and company reconstructions became rarer, this audit
department made its services available to the general public
[Meisel, 1992, p. 7; Haibt, 1998]. The audit was offered as a
preventative device, a periodic control to support the monitoring
function of the supervisory board. The audit was utilized to
assess potential threats to the financial stability of the company
and determine how these could be averted [Henning, 1990],
and thus to prevent company collapses [Hintner, 1926, p. 16].
Hintner [ibid.; with reference to Lansburgh, 1908] points out
that this function was very successful. The Deutsche Treuhand
Gesellschaft carried out 27 such external audits in 1903, 70 in
1904, and more than 400 in 1907.
From 1906 auditing was the Deutsche Treuhand Gesell-
schaft’s main activity [Hintner, 1926, p. 59; Rosendorff, 1906].
Its success led to the formation of similar companies, especially
by banks [Haibt, 1998; see also Klausing, 1933, p. 174]. By the
early 20th century audit work was the main occupation of many
THGs [Haibt, 1998], but in spite of the firms’ changing remit
their old organizational and legal forms were retained. They also
became the model for new THG foundations [Hintner, 1926, p.
119]. While company collapses in 1900-1903 led to renewed
pressure for the introduction of a statutory external audit, the
foundation of the THGs initially appears to have abated this.
The numbers of BR and of audit THGs increased considerably.
However, a lack of formal regulation of the emerging profession
meant that there was no control over quality, and there was
concern that poorly qualified individuals might damage the
reputation of those more competent to perform audits
[Gietzman and Quick, 1998]. Römer [1905, p. 270, footnote 1,
translation] complained:
12 They had to establish firstly whether a successful reconstruction was pos-
sible, then may have been involved in carrying out regular audits, i.e. to attest
the accounts in order to establish, for example, whether conditions imposed by
creditors were complied with [Hintner, 1926, pp. 15-16].
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How Bücherrevisoren are sometimes “trained” in Ger-
many and Austria, or how it is at least attempted to
“train” them is shown by the following two advertise-
ments, of which one was repeatedly published in Aus-
trian, the other in Berlin papers:
No. 1. “For 50 Marks anybody can [train to] become a
good Bücherrevisor with me. If he does without instruc-
tion in Geschäftswesenheit (!),13 including commerce
and Aktiengesellschaft, and without the trial audit of
forged company accounts, the fee only amounts to 30
Marks!” – No. 2. “Audit course including exam and di-
ploma 30 Marks!” – Is that not more than shameful? I
have often been asked by young and old people how to
become Bücherrevisor in Germany, and I have only ever
had one answer: “By accident!” That such a state is
unworthy of Germany does not need saying.
Another statement from a provincial newspaper highlight-
ing the same problem also appears in Römer [1905, p. 271,
footnote 1, translation]: “Warning! Recently unemployed indi-
viduals, who understand neither double entry bookkeeping nor
accounts preparation, have frequently been promoting them-
selves as Bücherrevisoren. Are they “Bücherrevisoren”? When will
this issue be remedied?”
From the end of the 19th century, and especially during the
first decades of the 20th century, common standards for audit
work and standardized fee rates were developed [Beigel, 1924, p.
43]. Further, a number of professional associations were
formed, representing the THGs and the BR respectively [Meisel,
1992, pp. 129-150; Markus, 1997, p. 3-9; Haibt, 1998]. These
included the Verband Deutscher Bücherrevisoren (VDB) which
was founded in 1896. It was hoped that membership of this
association would raise the reputation of its members
[Penndorf, 1932].14 The Verband Deutscher Treuhand- und
Revisionsgesellschaften was created in 1920 in order to represent
the interests of the smaller THGs not linked to banks. The fact
that the small audit firms created associations effectively forced
the larger firms to do the same in order to be able to represent
their interests before relevant authorities and the public. Thus
13 Note that this is not a meaningful term in German. In general the German
in the original advert is poor.
14 According to Hintner [1926, pp. 54-55], by 1925 the VDB had 842 mem-
bers, while the number of sworn-in BR active in Germany at about this time was
estimated as approximately 2000.
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the Reichsbund Deutscher Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaften was cre-
ated to represent the large THG AGs [Hintner, 1926, pp. 82-84].
Although pursuing contrasting agendas in other respects,
the different associations united in their demand for the legal
regulation of the external audit [Meisel, 1992, pp. 151-167;
Markus, 1997, pp. 12-13]. They were supported in this by the
banks, the legal profession [Quick, 1990; Haibt, 1998], academ-
ics and the trade press [Klausing, 1933]. At the same time de-
mands were made for standardized regulation of the education,
training, appointment and licensing of members of the audit
profession [ibid.]. By 1924 the VDB had drafted suggestions for
legislation governing the regulation of the audit and the educa-
tional, ethical and other criteria for entry to the profession. A
second version was later drafted jointly with representatives of
other associations of BR. However, both these attempts were
rejected because of concerns that they were intended to protect
the interests of the BR by implementing restrictive practices
detrimental to the public interest [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998,
pp. 88-89]. Voß [1927, p.1, translation], a syndic of the VDB, and
thus an interested party, commented as follows:
. . . the discussion of the problem in the public domain
has been infected by the most diverse interests. One can
choose to retain the corporation law in its current con-
tent, one may choose to reform it, in any case economic
interests are at risk, which appear to be diametrically
opposed and whose representatives in turn, and in ex-
cluding each other, claim their interests alone represent
those of the public.
Thus the diverging interests of the various professional
groups comprised an obstacle to the regulation of the audit and
the profession [Klausing, 1933, p. 176]. Their views on how the
profession should be controlled differed considerably, on issues
such as legal and organizational forms, self-regulation or state-
control, and the regulation of education, training and licensing
[see also Meisel, 1992, p. 151]. Other (and earlier) arguments
against the introduction of the statutory audit related to a per-
ceived lack of suitably qualified auditors [Klausing, 1933, pp.
175, 177]. Weber-Boun [1904, p. 30, translation] compared inter
alia the training of British accountants with the situation in
Germany. He concluded that Germany was not ready for regula-
tion because “suitable individuals in sufficient number are not
available, a shortfall which at best could only be corrected in a
number of years”.
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The lack of comprehensive regulation of the audit resulted
in a reluctance by foreign lenders and investors to provide capi-
tal to German firms unless they had been audited by the lenders’
or investors’ own auditors [Markus, 1997, pp. 13-17; Haibt,
1998]. Foreign capital was required as a result of the economic
crisis following World War I. This led a number of Anglo-Ameri-
can audit firms to establish branches in Germany [Markus,
1997, pp. 14-17]. It also gave rise to suggestions to introduce an
external audit based on Anglo-American models (which were
rejected) [Haibt, 1998]. However, the economic crisis of the
1920s led to renewed pressure for the introduction of the statu-
tory audit [Meisel, 1992; Quick, 1990; Haibt, 1998]. It also en-
couraged increasing state intervention in the economy. In 1925
the state-owned Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand-AG
(Treuarbeit) was created, which increasingly carried out audits
of enterprises in which the state owned shares, and additionally
gained appointments through the representatives of private en-
terprise on its own supervisory board. Many of these audits had
previously been carried out by BR working as sole-proprietors
or in small firms [Haibt, 1998, p. 33].
By the late 1920s the German audit (at its best) had devel-
oped from being a formelles (“formal”) audit, concerned with
presentation and legal compliance, to a materielles (“material” or
“substantial”) audit, concerned with examining the economic
validity of measurements and valuations and assessing the situa-
tion of an enterprise as a whole [Schwäbische Treuhand-
Aktiengesellschaft (Schitag), 1931]. However, until it was regu-
lated by law, the scope of the audit remained under the control
of the supervisory board which commissioned it, and was often
limited [Schitag, 1931]. The state still hesitated to introduce re-
forms until spectacular collapses took place between 1929 and
1931 (especially that of Favag, summer 1929). These convinced
the legislature that the control function of the supervisory board
and the voluntary or internal audit were insufficient, that the
audit profession required regulation, and that a compulsory an-
nual audit was required [Klausing, 1933, p. 177].
Further, by this time the different associations of BR and
THGs had, after long negotiations, jointly founded the Institut
für das Revisions- und Treuhandwesen (August 1930), which in
early 1932 became the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer [ibid.]. The
statutory audit was finally introduced (although initially only for
very large companies), the profession of Wirtschaftsprüfer (WP)
formally “created”, and additional accounting and publication
requirements implemented with the reform of the corporation
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law through the presidential decree Verordnung des Reichs-
präsidenten über Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine
Steueramnestie in 1931. The new law contained specific rules on
the appointment, independence and rights and duties of the au-
ditor [Quick, 1990; see also Meisel, 1992, pp. 168-203; Markus,
1997, Chapter 2].
Bücherrevisoren versus Treuhandgesellschaften: As indicated
above, the differing objectives and ensuing power struggle be-
tween the two “faces” of the profession, the BR and the audit
THGs, encouraged regulation by the state and contributed to the
delay in introducing the statutory audit. Disputes between the
groups centered on two main issues: the THGs’ increasing share
of the audit (and related services) market, to which their link
with the banks and/or state was a contributing factor, and the
question of organizational and legal forms. In relation to the
latter, the question arose as to whether a corporation (AG or
GmbH) could be a suitable legal form for the so-called freie
Berufe (“free professions”)15 with their ideologies of indepen-
dence, public service, responsibility, and individual judgment.
Two publications in the 1920s illustrated the different positions
– Beigel’s [1924] Lehrbuch (teaching textbook) on accounting
and auditing contained a political condemnation of the THG
audit corporations, which he considered reflected the political
agenda of capitalism. Beigel considered THGs to be “obedient
servants of capitalist-speculative interests” [ibid., pp. 14, 52].
Hintner’s [1926] more moderate Habilitationsschrift16 stressed
the advantages of the bank-owned THGs. He distinguished three
types of audit THG AGs: bankmässig orientierte (those owned by
banks); erwerbsmässig orientierte (those founded by individual or
small numbers of BR), and; konzernmässig orientierte (those
founded by commercial enterprises/groups) [ibid., 1926, p. 60].17
One of the important differences between the different types
of legal forms and sizes of audit firms related to their financial
capital. On behalf of the large bank-owned THGs it was argued
that their share capital, which was usually considerable,
15 For a discussion of the differences between the terms “profession” (in the
UK) and “freie Berufe” (in Germany) see Vieten [1995, p. 487] or Kocka [1990, p.
62].
16 Second thesis required of those aspiring to an academic career.
17 At around Hintner’s time of writing there were 22 bankmässig orientierte
THG AGs, 85 erwerbsmässig orientierte THG AGs, and 12 konzernmässig
orientierte THG AGs [ibid., pp. 62-78].
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provided a security or bond against damages caused by auditors’
mistakes.18 The reputation of the associated banks themselves,
as well as that of the audit firms, also provided a source of non-
financial security. An established audit corporation had incen-
tives to avoid damage to reputation as much as an individual
practitioner. The reputations of the management and supervi-
sory board members offered an additional bond. This provided
incentives for the large firms to implement careful personnel
and monitoring policies. The konzernmässig orientierten THGs,
especially if older, also often had a reputation which could act
as security. But, according to Hintner [1926] the share capital,
and thus the financial bond, was considered to be too low.19 He
suggested that the title THG AG might have been intended to
mislead the market as to the size of the enterprise.
According to Beigel, it would have been impossible to sue
auditors for errors, because the law held the supervisory board
solely responsible and liable for the supervision of management
[see HGB 1897 §§ 246-249]. In his view, the financial bond was,
therefore, of limited significance. He further stressed that the
audit was carried out by employees of the corporations. An error
by one of these employees would have led to a reprimand or
perhaps dismissal, but did not threaten the existence of the cor-
poration. While the unincorporated sole practitioner had no
large financial bond to offer, Beigel [1924, pp. 31-32, 52-53]
stressed that the loss of reputation might have meant the loss of
one’s livelihood. Hintner conceded that the sole practitioner,
with his personal liability, provided a stronger bond than the
small THG AGs, whose owners risked only their share capital
and damage to the reputation of the firm. Both corporations
and individuals could increase the guarantees they provided
through insurance, but it was not always easy for individual
auditors to obtain such cover [Hintner, 1926, p. 94].
One of the strongest perceived advantages of the BR was the
personal relationship of trust with the client. This was linked to
18 Hintner also pointed out that it was common for only 25% of the share
capital to be paid up. This suggests that it was mainly intended as a security for
the client rather than being required for the running of the company.
19 For example, he considered RM 5,000-10,000 to be too low. For the bank-
related THGs the share capital ranged from RM 5000 to RM 1,200,000, with an
average of approximately RM 120,000. For the erwerbsmässig orientierten the
average was less than RM 40,000 and for the konzernmässig orientierten RM
157,000. Note that these sums cannot be compared with those in footnote 6
because, following the hyperinflation of the early 1920s, a new currency, the
Rentenmark (RM, later Goldmark) was introduced in 1923.
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personal liability. The relationship between the employees carry-
ing out audits on behalf of the THGs and the THGs’ clients was
less strong. Hintner considered this to be an advantage, because
it strengthened independence. Further, large THGs attempted to
provide continuity in the staff that served particular clients, in
order to create personal trust relationships similar to those of-
fered by the sole BR. They had, however, the opportunity to
rotate staff if necessary to protect independence [Hintner, 1926,
p. 94]. BR also relied on employees to carry out audit work on
their behalf. Beigel [1924, p. 54] argued that they merely used
their employees, under supervision, to carry out minor tasks
while the employees of the THGs used a formulaic approach,
and the audit report was signed by the THGs’ directors without
any audit work being reviewed in detail.
A further controversial point was the competence and skill
available to the different types of audit organizations. The
knowledge and abilities of the BR varied considerably. Accord-
ing to Hintner, many did not have the necessary skills. Voß
[1927] lamented the fact that, while BR appointed by state or
regional authorities (such as the chambers of commerce) were
subject to some degree of regulation and disciplinary sanctions,
in general the title Bücherrevisor was not protected. Anybody
could call themselves Bücherrevisor, found an audit firm and
carry out audit work, without having to provide any evidence of
suitability for this work. Voß stated: “It is no secret that there
are many among these individuals who have a criminal record
or who otherwise had a shady reputation and who are probably
least likely to be suited, in particular for such a trust-based
profession as that of the auditor” [ibid., p. 29, translation]. Be-
ing formally licensed was thus a desirable goal for sole practitio-
ners because it would raise their reputation in the eyes of the
public [Hintner, 1926, p. 53]. However, there seemed to be little
consistency in what was required of BR by the chambers of
commerce. Hintner [1926, p. 23] points out that the strong posi-
tion of the THGs in the audit market was partly due to the fact
that they had access to better trained personnel than was the
case for the BR and their larger capital base permitted them to
obtain better staff and allow a certain degree of industry special-
ization. Further, more experienced staff could leave routine
tasks to their assistants. Also, a separation of audit from closely
related work would not be feasible nor desired by clients. Thus a
knowledge of both tax and legal matters was required, which
could be more easily provided by the larger firms.
One of the main criticisms of the THGs concerned auditor
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independence. It was argued that the audit firms founded by
banks and commercial/industrial groups lacked independence
from their clients. Clients often belonged to the same group and
were given little choice in the appointment of auditors. So, for
example, Römer [1905, p. 138, translation] stated: “It is prob-
ably of more concern that the German Treuhandgesellschaft as
auditor cannot be considered independent according to the En-
glish meaning: it should not have pitched its tent in the palace of
the Deutsche Bank and should have turned towards the pure
banking business less energetically!”
Hintner [1926, p. 100] by contrast, argued that attacks on
the independence of the bankmässig orientierten THGs were un-
justified, because the banks would have no interest in influenc-
ing an audit opinion (but see below). With regard to the
konzernmässig orientierten THGs he argued, though, that the au-
dit was merely equivalent to an internal audit function, as audit
clients were owners (and members of the supervisory board) of
the audit firm and could thus influence the scope of the audit
and the audit process. This might not have been known to exter-
nal shareholders of the auditee [ibid., pp. 100-101].20 On the
other hand, the more substantial capital base of the large THGs
strengthened their independence because it rendered them less
dependent on the fees of an individual client [Hintner, 1926, p.
95]. Theermann [1930, p. 43, translation], a director of a THG
AG, claimed that bank-owned audit firms were less dependent
than the firms without such links because the latter were eco-
nomically dependent on those who made appointments:
I would even like to claim that a bank audit firm often
faces the auditee more “independently” in that it re-
ceives the audit appointment directly from the supervi-
sory board and does not have to make an effort with the
auditee to obtain the appointment. . . . many “free” au-
ditors are finding themselves in the most difficult per-
sonal economic struggle and for this reason very often
are “unfree” when facing their clients. Many criminal
court cases of recent times give a sad verdict on this.
A concern related to the lack of independence was client
confidentiality. Beigel claimed that THGs would breach confi-
dentiality by disclosing sensitive information to the banks with
which they were linked:
20 See also Klausing, 1933, p. 241, for a critique of the apparently common
practice to disguise or window dress such links between auditor and auditee.
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To the outside these companies present themselves as
independent organizations, and the firms which place
themselves, with their books and balances, into their
care for the purposes of auditing appear not to know
that a double role is taken in this, in that the results of
the audit are presented to the client; then however also
the bank21 will receive a report regarding the turnover,
credit and asset situation, in short covering everything
which may be of interest to it. In suitable cases the
audit firm receives particular instructions from the
bank regarding which points to keep a special eye on
during the audit [Beigel, 1924, pp. 22-23, translation].
Further: “Businessmen as well as Aktiengesellschaften have
repeatedly complained about the fact that private commercial
activities had become known to non-authorized agencies” [ibid.
p. 24, translation].22 23 However, Hintner [1926, pp. 121-127]
disagreed and claimed that many THGs had developed internal
rules to prevent breaches of client confidentiality.
Part of the objection to the corporate form appears to have
been related to the THG AGs’ large size. The GmbH is a corpo-
rate form more suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises
and has a lower minimum capital requirement. Share owner-
ship is not anonymous and can be more easily monitored and
controlled. According to Hintner [1926, pp. 81-82] the number
of GmbH audit firms increased dramatically after World War I,
but many disappeared just as rapidly. Hintner considered this
legal form unsuitable because it lacked the financial backing to
provide security, no longer guaranteed the personal relationship
with the client which the sole practitioner offered, and was not
publicly accountable. Further, the auditor was usually the
21 Beigel uses the term Großbank (lit.: “large/major bank”).
22 As further evidence Beigel [1924, pp. 28-29] quotes as follows from the
journal Die Bank: “Concerning the fees which the audit firms are claiming … the
costs of the audit are that highly calculated, that really only candidates for
company foundations can normally afford the luxury to charge an audit firm
with the audit of its management. A number of years ago, for example, the
Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft was involved in a court case because a foundry
would not accept its fees (500 M. for the first, 100 M. for each of the following
days). Later, incidentally, the fees of some firms were somewhat reduced. It
showed that knowledge of others’ balance sheets brings so many indirect advan-
tages, that a little bit of fee income more or less is not relevant” [Buxbaum, 1910,
quoted in Beigel, 1924].
23 It was alleged, for example, that banks founded audit THGs in order to use
them to identify investment targets. This claim is dismissed by Hintner [1926] as
crude and unfeasible, and as not justified by the behaviour of the banks.
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founder, shareholder and director, while friends or family mem-
bers formed the management board. No supervisory board was
required. In other words, no monitoring or control needed to be
provided [ibid.]. Some GmbHs attempted to enhance their repu-
tation (and bonds) through membership of professional associa-
tions. Size-related advantages of the THGs meant that the big
firms were often more suitable for larger clients and that higher
staff numbers allowed better mutual monitoring and control, as
well as specialization and the ability to tackle larger appoint-
ments (see above). On the other hand, the larger THGs would be
less profitable than sole practitioners because salaried staff
commit resources; high salaries were necessary to attract and
retain quality staff. The larger THG also incurred greater
overheads [Hintner, 1926].
From the early 1900s onwards, but especially in the second
and third decades of the 20th century, the audit market, which
had initially belonged exclusively to the BR, became divided: the
bankorientierten THGs were mainly involved in audits of compa-
nies in which banks had invested and were represented on the
supervisory boards, i.e. their appointment was not a voluntary
choice by the client. The small private business, on the other
hand, preferred the BR as auditor, because relationships of per-
sonal trust with an individual were more important. The secured
market share of the THGs restricted the BRs scope for expan-
sion. Competition for the independent sole practitioner also
arose from the foundation of small independent THGs, which
were unable to compete in the market with the larger bank- and
group owned THGs and instead pursued the audits of smaller
enterprises [Hintner, 1926, pp. 128-127].
DISCUSSION
The Audit Requirement and Professionalisation: An examination
of the development of the corporate audit in Germany reveals
early similarities with the experience of the UK. For example,
the internal audit contributed to the development of the external
audit; early audits were carried out by shareholder/director
committees; the development of the audit profession predated
the statutory audit requirement; voluntary audits predated regu-
lation, and; the profession attempted to introduce some degree
of self-regulation. For Watts and Zimmerman, such features
provide evidence in support of contracting theory. Nevertheless,
it appears that despite the above parallels, auditing, the audit
profession, and audit firms developed differently in Germany.
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For example, it is usually suggested that the “modern” German
profession was created by the state, while the UK profession was
created by practitioners [see Vieten, 1995, pp. 504, 487]. Also,
the earliest associations of accountants in Britain were officially
recognized (through Royal Charter) eighty years before the Ger-
man profession achieved a similar status through state recogni-
tion [ibid., p. 494].
Perhaps the most important causes of differences relate to
the respective economic contexts, particularly the growth of
joint stock corporations [Matthews et al., 1998, p. 242]. Hintner
[1926, p. 137] claimed that in England,24 unlike in Germany, no
fixed share capital had to be raised to found a corporation, and
that the existence of much private wealth enabled enterprises to
raise capital from investors without the help of banks. The Brit-
ish capital market always differed from that of other European
countries because: “it started earlier, benefited from the ready
availability of local finance, was granted a cheap and easy
mechanism for incorporating with limited liability, and oper-
ated in a laissez-faire environment in which the audit was the
main safeguard that the market, through contractual arrange-
ments between investors and management, came to insist on”
[Matthews et al., 1998, p. 245].
These factors are related to a further important difference,
namely the respective corporate governance arrangements. In
Germany, companies were traditionally financed by banks, and
the banks were usually represented on companies’ supervisory
boards. Thus the banks had a much closer involvement with
corporations, including the company formation process, than
was the case in the UK. Banks (in theory) exerted a degree of
monitoring over their investments from which other stakehold-
ers benefited [Hintner, 1926, p. 136; see also Gietzman and
Quick, 1998]. The foundation by the banks of the audit THGs
was a means to facilitate such monitoring [Hintner, 1926, p.
137]. In the UK and US, by contrast, management motivation
was (and is) effected through “a market for corporate control”
and fear of takeovers [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 83].
Hintner [1926, pp. 130-136] suggested that the audit developed
more slowly in Germany than in England because German law
provided better protection for shareholders and creditors
through provisions relating to the supervisory board, accounting
24 Note that German authors frequently focused specifically on England, or
used the term “England” with reference to the whole of the UK.
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and publication requirements, and minimum share capital.
Therefore the need for an audit would only have been felt in
exceptional cases, such as when there was suspicion of fraud or
other particular problems were being experienced. The British
law, however, lacked the protection for shareholders provided
by the German law, and shareholders created their own protec-
tion by demanding an external audit. Therefore, according to
Hintner [ibid., p. 136], the re-introduction of the statutory audit
in the UK in 1900 was merely the codification of existing prac-
tice. On the other hand, with the exception of the bank initia-
tives, due to the form of corporate governance the demand for
the audit in Germany was limited, and this restricted the growth
of the audit industry [ibid., p. 129]. Further, as discussed above,
in Germany the auditors’ reporting responsibilities were to the
supervisory board rather than to the shareholders, and the scope
of their work was usually more restricted [Gietzmann and
Quick, 1998, p. 85].
A further difference relates to the role played by the state in
the professionalization process. While in the UK professions
tended to develop “spontaneously” as a result of initiatives by
voluntary associations, in Germany they were created as a result
of “reform from above” through state initiatives [Neal and Mor-
gan, 2000, pp. 9, 46]. Parliamentary democracy developed in
Germany later than in the UK, and the reforms of the Napole-
onic regime continued to shape administration and jurispru-
dence [ibid., p. 21]. The result of this was that “bureaucratic
authority and constitutional government developed hand in
hand”, “social reforms were the result largely of the civil service
rather than any popular movement” and “[i]n Germany profes-
sional practitioners were far more inclined to look to the state to
organize and regulate the professions” [ibid., p. 9].25 For ex-
ample, Hintner [1926, pp. 141-166] argued that the audit profes-
sion should be subject to formal external supervision. Given its
authoritarian nature the support of the state was required. How-
ever, in spite of the German profession’s efforts to obtain regula-
tion, the state remained reluctant. Gietzman and Quick [1998, p.
90] speculate that this may have been because the members of
the profession were unable to “credentialize their expertise” and
25 The most popular means of organising associations was in the form of
Vereine (associations, societies), which are regulated by law and require registra-
tion and approval of their articles. This permits the authorities to control the
associations’ activities [Neal and Morgan, 2000]. The associations of auditors
were generally registered as Vereine.
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that therefore the profession chose a deliberate strategy of in-
volving academic and state bureaucracies in their development.
As a result these bureaucracies, including higher education, be-
came more influential and led the profession to develop with a
different identity from those in Anglo-American countries
[ibid.]. In consequence “German auditors found it less problem-
atic to view the state and thus society as in part constituting the
client, unlike the more parochial view of British auditors” [ibid.,
pp. 90-91].
Education also formed part of the German and British pro-
fessions’ differing strategies. In Germany, business schools were
founded as early as 1898 – the Handelshochschule in Leipzig was
the first and offered a course for auditors in 1907. Others soon
followed [Karoli, 1934, p. 23]. In the UK, initiatives to introduce
accounting at universities remained rare: “the subject was
largely ignored by British universities while, for their part, the
accounting associations remained entirely committed to their
own pupillage and examination system of qualification”
[Matthews et al., 1998, p. 260].
Vieten suggests that when the state eventually intervened in
Germany, the recognition of the auditing profession was an at-
tempt to control companies and to allow the state to protect the
economic system and society in a much wider sense than was
the case in the UK where the emphasis was on the protection of
shareholders and creditors. According to Neal and Morgan
[2000, p. 20; also Vieten, 1995, p. 487], given the governments’
laissez-faire policies, the professions in Britain would have been
expected to regulate themselves, as there were few26 precedents
for state regulation. Thus professional status was linked in Brit-
ain to membership of elite organizations, rather than to state
recognition, as was the case in Germany. The creation of asso-
ciations also provided a limited safeguard against competition.
In summary, and with reference to the agency theory
assumptions outlined earlier in the paper, it can be concluded
that a separation of ownership and control existed in German
enterprises before, and increasingly after the development of the
AG. This appears to have been the case to a lesser extent than in
the UK for two reasons. Firstly, there were fewer public compa-
nies. Secondly, companies were financed differently, by finan-
cial institutions rather than individual external shareholders
[see Zysman, 1983]. The financial institutions were represented
26 Rare exceptions existed (for example, medicine).
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200356
on companies’ supervisory boards, were thus party to inside
information and in a position to monitor management’s behav-
ior. This reduced the separation between ownership and control
and the pressure for financial reporting and the independent
external audit as means of discharging the manager-agents’ ac-
countability. This indicates that existing agency problems were
not tackled in the same way in Germany. Monitoring was sup-
posed to be carried out by the supervisory board. As late as
1930, von Falkenhausen (a lawyer, 1930, p. 442, translation)
commented critically: “It is thought that the English regulations
can be implemented into German law, without considering that
the “auditors” of the English law have to fulfill a large part of
the functions of the German supervisory board. … a new inde-
pendent control organ [would] have no separate scope, its pow-
ers would overlap to a large extent with those of the supervisory
board”.
For monitoring to lead to a reduction of agency costs, the
market (or the principal) has to be convinced of the monitoring
agency’s competence and independence. However, the supervi-
sory boards were consistently criticized for their members’ lack
of expertise and involvement in companies’ management. The
explanatory memorandum to the 1884 Gesetz betreffend die
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften
actually argued that some involvement by supervisory board
members in the management activities of the company would
enable them to better meet their supervision and monitoring
duties [p. 289]. However, this involvement became increasingly
problematic, especially when finance from non-German sources
was required and foreign investors had to be attracted. The su-
pervisory boards began to appoint professional auditors to help
with the discharge of their responsibilities. The external audit
also struggled to convince the market of the auditors’ compe-
tence and independence. In particular the smaller BRs seemed
to suffer from a poor reputation regarding a lack of competence,
or at least a perceived lack of consistency in the quality of the
service provided. They were further unable to serve larger cli-
ents and to compete in a market increasingly controlled by com-
plex groups, including influential banks and their related audit
firms. The majority of the larger THGs, while perhaps able to
offer a better quality product, suffered from a lack of indepen-
dence. They could certainly not be considered as independent in
the sense expected of British auditors [see Römer, 1905, quoted
above]. However, with the exception of foreign investors, there
appears to have been less need to convince the market, as
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a market share was guaranteed through group structures and
networks. It appears that the audit was only one of a number of
ways of dealing with agency problems, and that the supervisory
board remained the main mechanism, supported by more de-
tailed company law. It remained liable for the monitoring of the
company, even when external auditors were appointed [see
above, also Gietzman and Quick, 1998, p. 85 and Beigel, 1924].
Further, while according to agency theory auditing is one of the
ways of reducing agency costs, in Germany an independent ex-
ternal audit appears to have been expensive [see e.g. Buxbaum,
1910], unless it could be provided by a firm within the same
group.
If self-regulation had been more successful, professional as-
sociations might have been a means of reducing the cost of
ensuring auditor competence and independence and the audit
might have provided better value for money. However, in Ger-
many the profession failed to sufficiently convince the market or
the state of their members’ competence. Nevertheless, there ap-
pears to have been a perception that an audit regulated by the
government would ensure the required quality and reduce
agency costs.
The audit developed differently from that in the UK. Its
scope in Germany was narrower and the auditors saw the super-
visory board, rather than the shareholders, as their main princi-
pal. It can be argued that an external audit was not really re-
quired to the same extent as in the UK, because, as suggested
above, due to different corporate governance arrangements the
separation between ownership and control was limited.
Agency theory and related assumptions regarding the orga-
nizational and legal forms of audit firms are now examined in
the German context, under the headings established earlier in
the paper.
Reputation and Professional Associations: As outlined above,
reputation and membership of professional associations can
serve as the auditor’s collateral bond [Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, Chapter 13]. Further, membership of a professional asso-
ciation signals the auditor’s competence and independence
[ibid.]. In the UK professional associations have a long history,
as has professional self-regulation. Velayutham [1996] argues
that corporatization is detrimental to professional self-
regulation because this is achieved through the control of indi-
viduals, i.e. firms that take the form of partnership are more
easily regulated through their individual owners. As we have
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seen, in Germany the different professional groups also began to
form associations long before the profession was regulated by
the state. The question arises whether these associations were
founded for the same reasons, intended to serve the same pur-
poses as their British counterparts, and whether their creation
supports Watts and Zimmerman’s arguments.
It appears that the motives for professional organization
were perhaps more heterogeneous in Germany than in the UK.
Clearly, the motivation of the BR, who founded the earliest asso-
ciation (the VDB), was similar to that of their UK counterparts.
It could also be argued in support of Watts and Zimmerman’s
assumption that the BR intended to raise their members’ reputa-
tion by standardizing audit quality and education requirements,
thus signaling their competence. As suggested by Hintner
[1926], those firms who had little to offer by way of financial
bonds would have benefited from organization – essentially let-
ting reputation and membership of an association serve as a
bond. The associations formed by the smaller THGs seemed to
have been driven by similar considerations. The Verband
Deutscher Treuhand- und Revisionsgesellschaften, for example,
did not accept bank-owned THGs as members because of con-
cerns over independence [Haibt, 1998]. However, it appears that
in the UK reputation and membership of professional associa-
tions were more important than in Germany because English
law did not provide much guidance to the auditor and the audit
opinion was to a larger extent based on subjective professional
judgment. Thus the reputation of the auditor was crucial in
adding credibility to the audited accounts [Hintner, 1926, p.
140]. Hintner seems to consider the “good name” of the auditor
in the UK as synonymous with the title of chartered accountant.
In Germany, for the large audit corporations, especially
those owned by banks, the motivation for forming professional
associations was probably different. They did not require non-
financial bonds to the same extent as the BR, and while they
were not independent, they had less need for a reputation of
independence. However, when the BR and the smaller THGs
attempted to achieve regulation of the audit and the profession,
the larger THGs required an organization to represent their in-
terests. Following Velayutham’s [1996] suggestion, their result-
ant associations would have found it more difficult to regulate
their members and would have been unlike the associations
formed by the British profession.
Probably to a greater extent than the British profession, in
the 1920s the German associations lobbied the government for
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audit regulation. This may have been an attempt to gain market
control. It may also have been due to the fact that, while the
German profession looked towards the UK profession as a
model [see e.g. Karoli, 1934, p. 21], its members misunderstood
the role of the state (and of the Royal Charter) in the UK.
Karoli’s interpretation of the developments in the UK suggest
that he believed there to be a considerable degree of state inter-
ference [1934, pp. 19-20]. It is possible that such perceptions of
state initiatives in the UK was an additional reason why German
auditors lobbied for state intervention. It is perhaps more likely
that, as a result of the environmental and cultural differences
discussed above, the German profession employed a different
strategy to “credentialize its expertise” by relying on academic
education and state regulation [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p.
90].
Organisational Form: Agency theory/contracting theory makes
the following claims: unlimited liability provides larger collat-
eral bonds in the form of the partners’ personal assets [Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986, Chapter 13]; unlimited liability signals
the auditors’ independence to the market [ibid.]; risk is not di-
visible or transferable, hence larger resources are required for
monitoring and only limited capital is available for expansion
and diversification [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 522]; joint
and several liability provides strong incentives for mutual moni-
toring [ibid.]; mutual monitoring increases incentives for com-
petence and independence [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Chap-
ter 13]; and, audit firms have few assets - the most important
asset being human capital [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, pp. 522-
523].
In 1926 Hintner [pp. 120, 138] argued that the large accoun-
tancy firms in the UK were comparable to the German audit
corporations because they, too, relied on the division of labor.
They were managed by a number of owners and often employed
a staff of up to 100, and as a rule more than 10. The only and
purely external difference, according to Hintner, was that the
German audit firms were legal entities, while the English firms
were partnerships. This was an oversimplification. Many of the
agency theory/contracting theory assumptions do not apply to
German THGs, especially the large ones linked to banks or com-
mercial groups. If formed as an AG, they would have had to
meet the considerable capital requirement legally prescribed for
this form. If founded by the government or banks, the raising of
this capital would not have been a problem and, as argued
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above, would be available as a substantial collateral bond. The
limitation of liability would have reduced the incentives for mu-
tual monitoring. The need for monitoring would have been (in
theory at least) partially met by the supervisory boards, al-
though it is unlikely that these were involved in monitoring the
audit work itself as they lacked the expertise and would have
been prevented by confidentiality rules. Firms founded and
owned by banks could not be considered to be independent,
especially if their shares were held by audit clients. However,
this also meant that they were less dependent on a free market
and, therefore, did not need to signal their independence and
competence in order to compete. The German legal definition of
the audit client differed from that in Anglo-American countries
as a result of the role of banks in corporate governance
[Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 82].
Finally, Fama and Jensen [1983b, p. 334] suggest that the
residual claims of professional partnerships are characterized by
flexible sharing rules, inalienability and limited horizons. These
features distinguish them from the residual claims of other or-
ganizations and are retained when professional partnerships be-
come corporations.27 This does not apply to German THGs dur-
ing the period under investigation, since it was possible to sell
ownership shares in an audit firm to non-auditor outsiders (al-
though Hintner, [1926, p. 60] claims that this was not common).
Size: Agency theory/contracting theory suggests that larger firms
can offer larger bonds, provide greater opportunities for mutual
monitoring and may be better able to develop brand names
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Chapter 13]. This situation ap-
plied to German corporate firms. However, while in the UK,
with its large professional partnerships, the residual claimants
were also audit experts, this was not the case in German audit
corporations. This had implications for the need for monitoring,
which was to some extent carried out by the audit firms’ super-
visory boards. Also the suggestion that decision control systems
would be similar for different types of organizations did not
apply in Germany, but the crucial factor appears to have been
less the size or even the legal form of the audit firm, but rather
whether it was owned and controlled by auditors or by external
owners. Other size-related factors were the ability of the larger
audit firms to provide specialization and offer a range of
27 This appears to be supported by van Lent’s [1999] evidence regarding
KPMG in the Netherlands.
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services, which enabled them to increase their market share.
Further aspects of size have already been covered, where rel-
evant, under the other two headings above.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the development of auditing and atti-
tudes to the legal and organizational forms of audit firms in
Germany prior to the formal regulation of the audit and the
audit profession in 1931. It concluded that there were parallel
developments in the UK and US, drawn on by Watts and
Zimmerman [1983] as evidence for certain agency theory as-
sumptions, and that, in particular, a separation of ownership
and control and similar agency problems existed. However, due
to different financing and corporate governance arrangements
in Germany these occurred to a lesser extent than in the UK and
US. Further, it was not generally accepted until relatively late
that an independent external audit would provide the best solu-
tion to these problems. When the independent external audit
was considered, it was only in addition to the monitoring func-
tions of the earlier German solution, the supervisory board, and
its acceptance appears to have been strongly influenced by the
British example. Thus auditing developed much later in Ger-
many as a secondary device to facilitate the supervisory board’s
monitoring duties.
The paper’s findings suggest that explanations offered for
the partnership form of audit firms by agency theorists may be
over-generalizing the role of professional organizations in famil-
iar Anglo-American cultural contexts. These theories may also
have limited explanatory value in relation to different cultures
and traditions. The findings of this paper suggest that different
attitudes to the organizational features of audit firms appeared
only partly to be determined by legal form. Perhaps greater ex-
planatory value is offered by the factor of size. This is supported
by Fama and Jensen’s [1983a, 1983b] claim that certain features
of professional firms are retained even when these firms incor-
porate. Van Lent’s [1999] more recent findings regarding KPMG
in the Netherlands also suggests that the organizational/gover-
nance structure did not change significantly when the firm in-
corporated. However, an alternative, and possibly even more
significant explanatory factor for audit firms’ features is owner-
ship, i.e. by auditors versus external non-auditors, and thus the
question whether decision makers are also the residual risk-
bearers. The ownership of KPMG in the Netherlands did not
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change when the firm altered its legal form, and thus its gover-
nance did not change.
Further, as the audit market in Germany during the period
under investigation was structured differently from that in the
UK or US, it was less important to signal independence because
appointments were often arranged through the banks as joint
owners/capital providers of audit firms and clients. Finally, the
objective of the audit differed. In Germany the emphasis was
(and to some extent still is) more on compliance with law and
regulations, and less (as in Anglo-American countries) on the
assessment of fair presentation or true and fair view. This was
linked to different ownership and corporate governance struc-
tures in German compared to Anglo-American audit clients. As a
result, German auditors acted as agents to the supervisory
boards rather than to the shareholders [Gietzmann and Quick,
1998, p. 83] and were intended to aid the supervisory board in
discharging its accountability to shareholders. This again sug-
gests that independence was seen to be less important.
With regard to the paper’s subsidiary objective, the exami-
nation of the limitations of Watts and Zimmerman’s and more
general agency theory assumptions, it appears that, although
Watts and Zimmerman [1983] utilize historical evidence in sup-
port of their approach, agency theory is flawed as a basis for
historical theorization. The findings of the current study rein-
force Gray and Calvasina’s [1995, p. 35] warning against “ex-
tending modern rational expectations and assumptions to ear-
lier periods of history”. On closer examination and in the light of
recent developments, much of the agency theory explanation for
the legal and organizational form of audit firms is also suspect
in the UK and US contexts. For example, Lee [1993, p. 111]
argues that the suggestion that auditor liability is an incentive
for competence and independence [see Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, pp. 316-318]: “is inconsistent with recent developments in
the US and elsewhere to incorporate audit firms with limited
liability – that is, the position taken by such bodies as the AICPA
in the US that incorporation is permissible as a means of re-
stricting the exposure of auditors to the considerable financial
loss of litigation”.
It may be concluded that agency theory is less suitable as a
foundation for historical theorization than approaches which
analyze historical events within their social contexts [see Mills,
1993]. In other words, agency theory, its philosophical and
methodological shortcomings aside, is too narrow to form a sat-
isfactory basis of explanation. This highlights the importance of
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analyzing developments in the history of German auditing in
their particular contexts. The present paper has attempted to
provide an overview of these developments. Further detailed
study is required to better understand the complex history of
auditing and the organizational forms of audit firms in Ger-
many.
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